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Where should the CDU look for a new leader? Smack in the middle!

The German CDU needs a new party leader after Chancellor Angela Merkel announced today that she will step down come December. Even before the announcement was official, names were floated in Berlin and beyond. Friedrich Merz, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer and Jens Spahn have thrown their hat in the ring. Count on more candidates to step forward, while others may well withdraw. After all, the CDU has a strong tradition of sorting out these kind of things in backroom deals rather than drawing them out in broad daylight (looking at you, SPD!)

But where should the party look for a replacement for Ms. Merkel? One way to think about this is in terms of the political preferences of the party’s supporters. The below figure shows the distribution of preferences of those respondents to a 2017 post-election survey who said that they feel a particular strong attachment to the CDU. In other words, these are CDU partisans. Note that this group is more narrowly defined than that of CDU voters and that not every CDU partisan is necessarily a CDU voter at every election. The data come from the German Longitudinal Election Study.

Turns out CDU partisans are about as centrist as can be. And while an argument could be made that a party leader should be a person that pulls or pushes the party into a new direction, the political reality of mass parties suggests that a successful leader is a moderator rather than an innovator.

Who, then, is the most centrist of the three candidates that are known so far? Clearly, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. Friedrich Merz is too conservative on both a societal and and an economic dimension. Jens Spahn, on the other hand, has mainly positioned himself as a conservative critic on the societal dimension. Both candidates should not be able to trump the centrist Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, especially not if they are both upholding their candidacies, thus drawing on the same support base. Let’s wait till early December when the party has to make its final decision.

 

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The German Bundestag is very late at electing a chancellor. Here’s how late, exactly.

It’s been four months (and counting) since the German Federal elections and the country is still without a new government. After the center-left SPD decided last weekend to enter formal coalition negotiations with Angela Merkel’s CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, it is still far from clear if and when the three parties will agree to form a new government. Already the SPD’s youth organization is rallying to prevent the party’s base from agreeing on a yet-to-be negotiated formal coalition treaty. And on the conservative side, tensions are mounting between those who view the results of the preliminary talks between  the three parties as the final offer to the SPD and others who are willing to make yet more concessions to the social democrats.

We used historical data on government formation in Germany and calculated the time it took in the past from election day to the election of the chancellor in the Bundestag. As a parliamentary system, German governments are not determined by the results of the general elections. Rather, government formation is left to the parties in the newly elected federal legislature.

Time from federal parliamentary election to election of a chancellor in Germany, 1949-2013

Looking at data from the 18 Bundestag elections since 1949, we found that, on average, it took the federal legislature just shy of 40 days (39.8 to be precise) from election day to the election of a chancellor. The longest it ever took before the 2017 elections was after the elections in 2013, when 86 days passed before Angela Merkel was elected chancellor with the votes of the CDU, CSU and the SPD.

The German constitution gives the newly elected parliament  a maximum of 30 days after the election to meet for a first session (Article 39.2 of the German Basic Law). Considering the time from the first Bundestag session to the election rather than the time between general elections and election of the chancellor, this time is just under 11 days. Again, at (as of today) 92 days since the first Bundestag session, the current situation is highly unusual.

Download the data

Barring any upsets by the social democratic party base, Germany should have a new government by Easter. Failing this, the beacon of stability that is the German constitution, still leaves to possibility of forming a minority government; an option that while generally not well regarded in Germany, has worked well for a number of countries, including Germany’s neighbor to the north, Denmark. It stands to reason that a minority government with the lively debates it requires to secure majority support for specific policies would be an option that is preferable to yet another grand coalition and its de-politicizing tendencies.

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The “United States of Europe”? Politically, Schulz May Be On to Something

On Thursday, the German Social Democrat’s (SPD) party congress green-lighted talks with Chancellor Merkel’s center-right CDU that could lead to another grand coalition between the two parties (and the CDU’s Bavarian sister party, CSU). The Social Democrats had long resisted such a move, insisting that they needed to seek “renewal” in opposition.

However, after the breakdown of talks to form a “Jamaica” coalition consisting of CDU/CSU, the Greens and the pro-market FDP, the pressure on the SPD was mounting. Actors from the German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to a majority of the German public, to a majority of SPD supporters, called on the SPD to reconsider.

The party’s price for entering a grand coalition could be a “radically different vision of Europe” as the Washington Post reported on Thursday. Mr Schulz called for a new Constitutional treaty to establish the United States of Europe by 2025. Countries that don’t ratify this constitution would have to leave the EU automatically.

As a seasoned veteran of all things EU, Mr Schulz is probably aware that his proposal won’t fly in Europe. However, as far as German domestic politics is concerned, he may be on to something. Public sentiment in Germany is strongly pro-EU and a majority of Germans support more integration in the EU. These are the results from the most recent data from the European Social Survey.

There is considerable support for an increase in EU integration, as figure 1 shows. More than 53 percent of respondents in Germany supported an increase in integration while another 15.7 percent (the mode) are in the middle between strong support for either of the two extremes (“European unification has already gone too far” and “European unification should be further”).


Figure 1: Support for EU integration, ESS data
This political sentiment is also reflected by the emotional attachment Germans feel towards the EU. Figure two shows that almost 62 percent of respondents in Germany score higher than the value of five; the value at the center of the distribution which can be taken to signify emotional indifference towards the EU.

Figure 2: Emotional attachment to the EU, ESS data

Both values are considerably higher in Germany than they are in the rest of the EU countries in the ESS sample. Support for further increases in EU integration in those countries is at around 35 percent, while positive emotional attachment is felt by 54 percent of respondents.

What does that mean for Martin Schulz and the Social Democrats? If Mr Schulz is able to sell the SPD’s entry into yet another grand coalition as a feat that furthers the process of European unification, this should go down well with many Germans. Support for the EU is strong and strengthening integration is viewed favorably by a majority of Germans. This could help Mr Schulz in overcoming resistance from within the SPD. Furthermore, EU integration is in the DNA of the SPD’s prospective coalition partner, with famed first chancellor Konrad Adenauer (CDU) being widely viewed as the father of “western integration” (“Westbindung”). Whether these positive views of the EU translate into German willingness to support more redistribution within Europe, as French President Macron’s plan seem to suggest, is, of course, another matter.

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On the map: Turnout and party support in the 2017 German federal elections

Following up from yesterday’s post, we can also look at a map of Germany to see where the electoral losses for the  center-right CDU/CSU were most severe. The party incurred their most severe losses in parts of Saxony and Bavaria, former party strongholds, but also in the Southwestern state of Baden-Württemberg.

Change in electoral support (party vote) for the CDU/CSU in the 2017 German federal elections

By contrast, the far-right party AfD increased their vote share most markedly in East Germany and parts of Bavaria.

Change in electoral support (party vote) for the AfD in the 2017 German federal elections

Finally, we can look at the change in turnout. Turnout increases were largest in Bavaria and parts of East Germany. As we have seen,  increased mobilization benefited the AfD and hurt the CDU/CSU.

Change in voter turnout in the 2017 German federal elections

Interpretation:  The AfD was able to asymmetrically mobilize voters that supported their anti-immigrant and anti-establishment positions. In September 2017, less than two weeks before the election, more than 80 percent of AfD supporters said that the “AfD is the only party through which I can express my protest against current policies”. The same share of AfD supporters agreed that the “AfD does not solve any problems, but at least they tell it like it is.” (Source: ARD-DeutschlandTREND). This, together with the turnout analysis, suggests that the AfD mobilized previously alienated voters by taking positions that were not represented by other parties in the political arena.

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How voter mobilization benefited the far-right German AfD

The September 24, 2017 German federal elections saw the far right, anti-immigrant and euro-skeptical party “Alternative for Germany” (“Alternative für Deutschland” – AfD) surging to third place behind chancellor Merkel’s center-left CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats. With the AfD’s success the focus of most observers, an interesting phenomenon has been largely overlooked, namely the fact that the AfD disproportionately benefited from increased turnout. We analyzed some of the available data at the level of electoral districts and found that the AfD was particularly strong in those districts that saw the largest increase in voter turnout.

The following table shows results from a regression analysis that models vote share as a function of a number of covariates, including the change in electoral participation (the turnout variable). Focussing on model 3 where the AfD’s vote share is the dependent variable, we find that the AfD massively benefitted from an increase in turnout. Increasing the change in turnout (i.e. mobilization) from its mean by one standard deviation leads to a one percentage point increase in AfD votes.

Determinants of Electoral Success, German Federal Elections 2017
CDU/CSU SPD AfD
(1) (2) (3)
Change in Turnout from 2013 0.214* -0.872*** 0.510***
(0.116) (0.119) (0.103)
Population Density -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Disposable income per capita 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Higher Education (percentage Abitur) -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment -0.006*** 0.011*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Percentage migration background -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
East -0.073*** -0.134*** 0.112***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant 0.427*** 0.286*** 0.107***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.028)
Observations 299 299 299
R2 0.718 0.724 0.729
Adjusted R2 0.711 0.717 0.723
Residual Std. Error (df = 291) 0.032 0.033 0.028
F Statistic (df = 7; 291) 105.830*** 108.835*** 111.919***
Notes: ***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.

This is substantively important, given that the AfD fell short of clearing the threshold for parliamentary representation by just 0.3 percent in the 2013 federal elections. On the other hand, the SPD massively lost from an increase in turnout, showing that the party was not able to speak to its voters.

Of the other variables, we observe a number of significant effects. Most importantly the AfD is stronger in the east. On average, going from a Western district to one in the East increases AfD vote share by more than 11 percent.

Secondly, the AfD is stronger in less populated areas, i.e. outside the big cities. The AfD is also stronger where voters are less educated and where unemployment is higher.

Finally, the AfD is stronger in districts where the share of the population with a “migration background” is higher. It is important to note that the Federal Returning Office defines “migration background” as follows: “Migration background means foreign nationals plus all those Germans who came to Germany after 1955 plus all those Germans with at least one parent who came to Germany after 1955” – “Als Personen mit Migrationshintergrund werden alle zugewanderten und nicht zugewanderten Ausländer sowie alle nach 1955 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zugewanderten Deutschen und alle Deutschen mit zumindest einem nach 1955 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zugewanderten Elternteil definiert.” (Federal Returning Office). Immigrants from Russia who came to Germany in the early 1990s and who disproportionately support the AfD could explain this effect. (see, for example, here.)

How important was each of these variables in relation to each other? To see this, we can turn to z-score standardized coefficients (beta coefficients) and their graphic representation on the following figure:

The strongest predictor in relative terms is the East dummy, then the education variable, followed by population density, the change in turnout from 2013, the percentage of people with migration background, and finally the unemployment variable. Note that the variable that captures disposable income is not significant.

We can conclude by pointing out that the AfD success cannot be explained by economic grievances. The variable that captures income is not significant and the unemployment variable is a poor predictor once other factors have been taken into account. What matters most is the division between Eastern und Western districts. In the East, many voters seem to be alienated from established parties and possibly from the system as a whole. The AfD with their anti-system rhetoric was able to mobilize these voters. The geographic and educational divide of the electorate is reminiscent of the situation in other countries, for example in the US.